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This paper reviews the quantitative methods developed at selected authorities for stress 
testing credit risk, focusing in particular on the methods used to link macroeconomic drivers 
of stress with bank-specific measures of credit risk (macro stress test). Authorities with a 
mandate for financial stability are particularly interested in quantifying the macro-to-micro 
linkages and have developed specific modeling expertise in this field. Stress testing credit risk 
is also an essential element of the Basel II Framework. The paper highlights recent 
developments in macro stress testing and details a number of methodological challenges that 
may be useful for supervisors in their review process of banks’ models as required by Basel 
II. It also contributes to the on-going macroprudential research efforts to integrate 
macroeconomic oversight and prudential supervision, for early detection of key vulnerabilities 
and assessment of macro-financial linkages. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper reviews the quantitative methods developed at selected central banks and 
supervisory authorities to assess the vulnerabilities of financial systems to credit risk, 
focusing in particular on the stress test methods used to link macroeconomic drivers of stress 
with bank-specific measures of credit risk. It is based on a number of recent papers and 
internal documentation provided by supervisors and central banks. The models included in 
this survey are listed in Table 1. 
Financial sector stress tests provide information on a system’s potential losses under 
exceptional but plausible shocks, helping policymakers to assess the significance of the 
system’s vulnerabilities. The value added by system stress tests derives from a consultative 
process that combines a forward-looking macroeconomic perspective, a focus on the financial 
system as a whole, and a uniform approach to the assessment of risk exposures across 
institutions.
1 System stress tests can complement those of individual institutions, and provide 
a cross-check for other types of analysis. 
For many authorities the practice of stress testing was introduced as part of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) conducted by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The FSAP stress tests stimulated widespread research interest in developing new techniques 
and many additional studies are under way. The survey includes methodologies that were 
used during the FSAPs and other studies developed afterwards at the individual agencies. 
The focus on credit risk and on the “macro-to-micro” models reflects a number of 
concerns: (i) stress testing credit risk is an essential element of the Basel II Framework 
(BCBS, 2005) and some stress testing requirements of Basel II – such as the IRB-cyclicality 
stress tests (par. 435-437) and the forward-looking stress testing in the ICAAP (par. 726) – 
are formulated by making explicit reference to the economic cycle (e.g. mild recession 
scenarios) and the macroeconomic background of a stress event; (ii) in this area, sound 
industry practices have not yet been established and the translation of a stress event defined in 
terms of macroeconomic variables into movements in bank micro-variables often represents a 
challenge for individual banks; (iii) both in the FSAP context and more generally for financial 
stability analysis, it is also one of the modeling areas most in need of further development.
2 
Because of their mandate for financial stability, central banks and supervisors are 
particularly interested in quantifying the macro-to-micro linkages and have developed specific 
modeling expertise. Such expertise can be a useful starting point to develop a common 
analytical background as, in this field, supervisors and banks often face the same 
methodological challenges. Sections 2-6 review the current stress testing practices across 
various supervision and financial stability authorities, comparing features and outlining the 
latest developments. Section 7 discusses a number of technical issues that may be relevant for 
supervisors in reviewing the Basel II stress testing requirements. As methods to better 
incorporate macro/system-wide conditions as drivers of default risk and macro-stress testing 
in general are among the main tools of supervisors with a “macroprudential” orientation, the 
                                                  
1   See IMF and World Bank (2003). 
2   See the discussion in Swinburne (2007).  
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discussion can also contribute to the on-going analytical efforts to integrate macroeconomic 
oversight and prudential supervision, as recently advocated by the Financial Stability Forum.
3 
Section 8 concludes and sets out a research agenda.  
 
2.  The stress testing process 
In all the approaches surveyed, system-focused stress testing can be seen as a multi-
stage process as shown in Figure 1.  
 




Given the origin and purpose of FSAPs, the first step is to put together a coherent stress 
test scenario, typically using a macro-econometric model. The scenario or the model may 
include endogenous policy responses. Given that such models do not generally include 
financial sector variables, the stress testing framework usually includes “satellite” models: (i) 
to map macroeconomic variables to some “key” financial variables, such as asset prices 
(typically, housing prices) and credit growth and (ii) to map macroeconomic and financial 
variables into financial sector measures of asset quality and potential credit losses. Total bank 
losses are calculated by aggregating credit and market losses, in some cases including 
additional allowances for the impact on net interest income and on funding costs.
5 Losses are 
then compared to the buffers of profits and capital.  
                                                  
3   See Financial Stability Forum (2008). 
4   This figure is adapted from Čihák (2007). For an overview of a typical stress testing process see also Jones, Hilbers, and 
Slack (2004). 
5    In fact, many of today’s macro-scenario stress tests also consider the effects of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ 
earnings, taking into account factors such as growth in lending and credit conditions. 
Stress Event 
Impact on banks’ balance sheet 
 
In terms of earnings, capital 
Macroeconomic model 
 
Links stress event to 
macroeconomic variables (e.g. 
GDP, interest rates, exchange rate) 
Credit risk “satellite” model 
 
Links the macroeconomic 
variables to variables 




Table 1 summarizes the common stress testing framework of the various agencies and 
classifies the models used in the different stages of the process according to their 
methodologies and assumptions.  
This approach has valuable strengths, but it also suffers from some important 
limitations. Generally, current models are weak in the treatment of key financial system 
interactions. For example, they only rarely model the impact of funding and market liquidity 
stresses or the correlation between credit, market and liquidity risks. Feedback effects are 
often absent or modeled in rudimentary fashion. Existing methods are generally unable to 
endogenously account for cross-border transmission channels for risk, including cross-border 
contagion between financial institutions. They often ignore potential non-linearities and 
structural breaks in estimated relationships. In addition, some approaches focus on a projected 
conditional mean stress scenario outcome and fail to consider the cross-sectional distribution 
of the losses that will be borne by individual financial institutions in a real-world stress 
situation.
6 
The market turmoil that began in mid-2007 in the US “subprime” mortgage market has 
highlighted the crucial importance of the links between credit risk, funding liquidity risk, 
market risk, and counterparty credit risk as well as other limitations of current stress tests. 
Addressing these limitations is therefore an important priority for both banks and financial 
stability authorities, as is shown by the recent initiatives undertaken by various international 
bodies.
7 Some of the enhancements designed to overcome specific problems of traditional 
stress testing techniques are addressed in the latest research projects initiated by the various 
agencies and are also reviewed in the following Sections.  
 
3.  The design of the macroeconomic stress scenario 
In macro-scenario stress testing, the financial sector effects of multiple shocks to 
macroeconomic and financial variables are estimated using different models. The stress 
scenario’s effects on macroeconomic conditions are typically measured using: (i) a structural 
econometric model, (ii) vector autoregressive methods, and (iii) pure statistical approaches. 
Many stress testing approaches use an existing structural macroeconomic model (e.g. 
one used by the central bank for forecasts and policy analysis) to project the levels of key 
macroeconomic indicators under the stress conditions assumed. A set of initial shocks are 
taken as exogenous inputs, and their interactions with the other macroeconomic variables are 
projected over the scenario horizon. The simulations will produce a range of economic and 
financial variables as outputs, such as GDP, interest rates, the exchange rate, and other 
variables.
8 
                                                  
6  The strengths and limitations of traditional stress tests were examined extensively at the ECB conference on “Simulating 
Financial Instability”, Frankfurt, 12-13 July 2007. 
7   As for the work of the Basel Committee related on stress testing liquidity risk, see BCBS (2008). 
8    Often macro models do not include key financial variables such as credit growth or asset price behaviour in their 
specification. However, these variables are typically found to be significant in explaining credit quality. An example of 
such “satellite” macro models is proposed by Norges Bank (Berge and Lindquist, 2007). Household credit is modelled as 
a function of housing prices, the interest rate, the turnover rate, demography, housing stock, income, and unemployment. 
Housing prices, in turn, are determined by housing credit, interest rates, unemployment, income, housing stock, and 
expectations.   
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The use of structural models imposes consistency across predicted values in the stress 
scenario. Moreover, they may allow for endogenous policy reactions to the initial shock. The 
feasibility of the approach for stress scenario analysis varies with modeling expertise and the 
type of macro model. Some considerations involved in using a macro structural model are 
discussed in Jones, Hilbers and Slack (2004), such as the choice of the baseline assumptions, 
the policy responses, the time horizon and which variables are assumed fixed and which are 
shocked. Another frequently mentioned concern is the inability of linear models to capture 
relationships between macroeconomic variables that may become non-linear at times of 
stress, as well as the difficulty in determining the likelihood of a specific macro-scenario. 
In the context of the FSAP exercise, all the authorities used the domestic 
macroeconomic models developed for monetary policy purposes. However, since a domestic 
model does not provide all the information that is needed when shocks arise from 
international linkages, in some cases the models were extended to incorporate international 
effects. 
If a well-developed macroeconomic model is not available or it is not considered 
feasible to generate consistent relevant shocks, a second possibility is vector autoregression 
(VAR) or vector error correction models (VECM). In these models, a set of macroeconomic 
variables are jointly affected by the initial shock, and the vector process is used to project the 
stress scenario’s combined impact on this set of variables. VAR models have appeal because 
they are a flexible and relatively simple way of producing a set of mutually consistent shocks, 
although they do not include the economic structure that is incorporated in the macro 
modelling approach.
9 As detailed in Table 1, these models are used in the studies developed at 
the central banks of the UK (BoE), Japan (BoJ), Spain (BoS), the Netherlands (DNB), and at 
the ECB. 
In its Financial System Report (2007), the BoJ estimates a VAR model comprised of 
five macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation rate, bank loans outstanding, effective 
exchange rate, and the overnight call rate). Van den End, Hoeberichts, and Tabbae (2006, 
DNB) and Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) use a VAR structure to model the response to a 
shock of the two macroeconomic factors included in an auxiliary credit risk model (see 
Section 4).
10 The model used by Castrén, Dées, and Zaher (2008, ECB) is a Global Vector 
Autoregressive (GVAR) model based on country- or region-specific VECM, where domestic 
and foreign variables interact simultaneously; the endogenous variables included in the 
country-specific models are real output, the rate of inflation, real equity prices, and short and 
long-term interest rates.
11 The BoE prototype model uses a two-country version of the GVAR 
                                                  
9   As noted by Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank), an important operational advantage of VAR models 
based on a few variables is that they do not require particularly substantial resources, and their results are easy to 
interpret. 
10   Van den End, Hoeberichts, and Tabbae (2006, DNB) also use a well-developed macro model (Norkmon/Nigem) to 
simulate macro stress scenarios. The projected path of macro variables (GDP, interest rate) is subsequently used as input 
in a VAR model (see Section 4). 
11   The GVAR is a set of 26 VAR(2,1) models specific to 25 countries and one specific to the euro area. Each model 
includes a set of domestic/regional macroeconomic variables (usually five or six) and a vector of foreign variables 
specific to the respective country/region. In addition to the usual macro-variables, the specification also includes the 
stock market return.  
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approach, modeling the UK and US economies only, with the same macroeconomic variables 
as in the ECB paper.
12  
In contrast to structural macro-econometric and VAR-VECM models, the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), in its Systemic Risk Monitor (SRM) has developed a 
pure statistical approach to scenario design.
13 Macroeconomic and financial variables are 
modeled through a multivariate t-copula. The copula approach has two important advantages. 
First, the marginal distributions can be different from the multivariate distribution that 
characterizes the joint behavior of the variables. Second, the co-dependence between the 
macro-financial variables displays tail-dependence (i.e., “correlation” increases under stress 
scenarios). However, as a “purely” statistical approach, it is not as well suited for policy 
analysis, because the transmission mechanism from shocks to impact is not easy to interpret. 
 
4.  The credit risk models 
Both the structural econometric and the VAR approaches require a method to map 
macroeconomic variables into indicators that can be used to estimate the implications of the 
stress scenario for banks’ balance sheets. Macroeconomic models, in fact, typically do not 
include a measure of credit risk, so the second stage of a stress testing process usually 
involves estimating satellite or auxiliary models that link a measure of credit risk to the 
macroeconomic model variables, thus mapping external shocks onto bank’s asset quality 
shocks. 
In these credit-quality regression models, loan performance measures are typically 
related to measures of macroeconomic conditions. Blaschke, Jones, Majnoni and Martinez 
Peria (2001) report an example in which the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) is regressed 
against the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, the change in real GDP, and the change in 
the terms of trade. The coefficients of the regression provide an estimate of the sensitivity of 
loan performance to those macroeconomic factors.  
The assumption is that loan quality is sensitive to the economic cycle. The estimation 
strategy normally requires the selection of an initial set of macroeconomic and financial 
variables that, according to theory and empirical evidence, affect credit risk. Variables such as 
economic growth, unemployment, interest rates, equity prices and corporate bond spreads 
contribute to default risk. In particular, interest rates are a crucial variable as they represent 
the direct cost of borrowing. Among alternative specifications, the preferred one is selected on 
the basis of the consistency of macroeconomic variables with economic theory (that is, the 
variable’s sign has to be “right”, otherwise it is dropped), and on the specifications’ goodness 
of fit.
14 
                                                  
12   In the BoE approach the GVAR is a set of two VAR(2,1) models, one for the UK and one for the US; the UK is treated as 
a small open economy and the US represents the rest of the world. The BoE approach (discussed in Haldane, Hall, and 
Pezzini, 2007) models income, market and credit risk jointly as well as some key feedbacks across banks, such as 
network and market liquidity externalities; a prototype version of the model is described in Alessandri, Gai, Kapadia, 
Mora, and Puhr (2007, BoE).  
13  SRM is a model developed by the Austrian central bank for systemic financial stability analysis and stress testing; the 
framework includes credit risk, market risk and interbank contagion risk. See Boss, Breuer, Elsinger, Jandacka, Krenn, 
Lehar, Puhr, and Summer (2006, OeNB). 
14   A detailed description of such an estimation strategy is provided in Segoviano (2006).  
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A satellite model that treats the macroeconomic variables as exogenous ignores – by 
construction – the feedback effects from a situation of distress in the banking system to the 
macro-economy, which is one of the many limitations of traditional stress testing. Castrén, 
Dèes, and Zaher (2008, ECB) argue that there are several possible reasons for this approach, 
such as a lack of sufficiently long time-series data, more modeling flexibility, easiness of 
implementation and interpretation.
15  
Unlike the macroeconomic model, the credit risk satellite model can be estimated on 
data for individual banks and even individual borrowers. Various modeling techniques have 
been applied so far, mostly depending on data availability. Čihák (2007) divides approaches 
into two classes: one based on data on loan performance, such as NPLs, loan loss provisions 
(LLPs), and historical default rates; the other based on micro-level data related to the default 
risk of the household and/or the corporate sector. The same classification is used in this 
section, highlighting the distinct features of the different approaches. The capstone of many 
credit risk satellite models is the estimation of the credit portfolio loss distribution, which 
summarizes its overall risk profile and permits a thorough assessment of the impact of a shock 
(see Section 6). 
4.1. Models based on loan performance 
In this approach the key dependent variables are the NPL ratio, the LLP ratio, and 
historical default frequencies. As shown in Table 1, these models include various 
macroeconomic factors, ranging in a number from two to five depending on the country. In 
some cases variables more directly related to the creditworthiness of firms are added, such as 
measures of indebtedness; in other cases, market-based indicators of credit risk, such as equity 
prices and corporate bond spreads, are also used.
16  
As regards the level of aggregation, and depending on the availability of data, models 
based on loan performance data can be run at aggregate level, at industry level or even at the 
level of the individual banks.  
Alessandri, Gai, Kapadia, Mora, and Puhr (2007, BoE) and Marcucci and Quagliariello 
(2005, Bank of Italy, BoI) model credit quality using observed default frequencies at 
household/corporate level of aggregation. Aggregate data allow Marcucci and Quagliariello to 
use a VAR approach to estimate the satellite credit risk model, whereas previously VAR 
models had been used in the first stage of the stress testing process.
17 Their model for the 
corporate sector includes the default rate and four macroeconomic variables (output gap, 
inflation, short-term interest rate and real exchange rate). In the identification scheme, the 
                                                  
15   The analysis of feedback effects is a core concern for financial stability work, as the recent intensification of the financial 
crisis has aggravated the downside risks to growth. The typical econometric framework that allows for feedback effects 
between the financial sector and the real economy is the VAR methodology, in which a vector of endogenous variables 
includes both a measure of credit quality (or another proxy of financial distress) and aggregate economic variables 
associated with the state of the business cycle (see the discussion in Chan-Lau, 2006). Two studies reviewed in this 
section actually apply this methodology: Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005, BoI), who explicitly address this issue, and 
Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank) who, however, discuss only the sensitivity of credit risk to shocks to 
the macroeconomic variables. 
16   Introducing market variables such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity and real estate price indices, into credit 
risk models is a way of explicitly integrating the analysis of market and credit risks. 
17   Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank) also use a similar approach, estimating a VECM model (see sub-
section 4.2).  
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default rate is assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to the output gap and all the other 
macroeconomic variables. The impulse response functions indicate significant impact of the 
various macroeconomic variables (except inflation) on the default rate. 
The credit risk models of the German Bundesbank (DB), Lehmann and Manz (2006, 
SNB) and Van den End, Hoeberichts, and Tabbae (2006, DNB) use the LLP ratio to measure 
credit quality at the individual bank level, with static or dynamic panel data estimation. The 
panel estimation of individual banks’ LLPs controls for individual bank characteristics that 
affect credit risk and captures the banks’ different sensitivities to macroeconomic 
developments.  
Fiori, Foglia and Iannotti (2008, BoI), Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) and the 
OeNB’s SRM all model historical default rates grouped by industry.
18 The sectoral 
breakdown allows the use of different macroeconomic variables to explain default frequencies 
in different industry sectors and the inclusion of sector-specific explanatory variables to 
improve the goodness-of-fit. For example, in the OeNB’s SRM model, the number of 
statistically and economically most reasonable explanatory macroeconomic variables ranges 
from two to four depending on the sector, with some variables common to all the sectors.
19 
In such models, macroeconomic variables that are found to be significant for many 
sectors represent the systematic risk component; inter-sectoral default correlation is due to the 
common dependence on the systematic component. The idiosyncratic risk component is 
measured by potential sector-specific variables and by the residuals of the sectoral equations. 
When systematic risk is taken into account, default events should be independent, and the 
cross-equation residuals should be uncorrelated (conditional independence). If that is not the 
case, macroeconomic factors do not fully explain the default correlations across sectors; an 
important implication is that a portfolio’s credit risk can be significantly underestimated (see 
discussion in Section 7).  
Fiori, Foglia and Iannotti (2008, BoI) and Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) argue that 
micro-contagion effects between sectors create an additional channel of default correlation. 
Using a different estimation strategy, both papers allow sectoral default frequencies to depend 
on macroeconomic conditions as well as on latent factors that can capture contagion effects. 
Accordingly, they are able to distinguish “cyclical” sectors (those highly sensitive to 
systematic risk) from those more dependent on idiosyncratic risk. Both studies find significant 
micro-contagion effects and similarly identify agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and 
trade as “cyclical” sectors, mining and quarrying and utilities as “idiosyncratic”.
20 
The use of loan performance data to measure credit quality raises some important 
questions. Loan performance is a lagged or “retrospective” indicator of asset quality, in that it 
reflects past defaults. Loan loss provisioning rules may vary across jurisdictions and legal 
                                                  
18   In addition to ten industry equations, Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) model one mortgage sector and a sector of 
consumer loans. 
19   GDP or industrial production, the unemployment rate, investment in equipment, and the price of oil are significant in 
more than one sector; see Boss (2003), pp. 64-82 for an explanation of the model selection procedure. 
20    Latent factors are orthogonal to the observable macroeconomic conditions. Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) use a 
Kalman filter to deal with the unobserved factors; Fiori, Foglia and Iannotti (2008, BoI) use factor analysis to identify the 
latent factors that account for the contagion component. Moreover, while Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) find only pure 
cross-sector contagion effects, Fiori, Foglia and Iannotti (2008, BoI) find two latent variables, one accounting for pure 
contagion and one representing a diversification effect.  
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protocols may determine whether or not institutions actually write off non-performing loans 
or keep them on their financial statements with appropriate provisioning; variations in LLPs, 
in addition, may be only partly driven by changes in credit risk; other bank-specific factors, 
such as income-smoothing policies, might also come into play.  
Another frequent problem in interpreting macroeconomic models of credit risk concerns 
the use of linear statistical models: the linear approximation may be reasonable when shocks 
are small, but when they are large, non-linearities are likely to be important. In fact, almost all 
the studies reviewed here, following Wilson (1997), have used non-linear specifications, such 
as the logit and probit transformation, to model the default rate. As Van den End, Hoeberichts, 
and Tabbae (2006, DNB) argue, non-linear transformations of the default rate extend the 
domain of the dependent variable to negative values and take into account the possible non-
linear relationships between macroeconomic variables and the default rate that are likely in 
stress situations. 
4.2. Models based on data for individual borrowers 
In this approach the credit risk satellite model is estimated on individual borrower data. 
In this case, the model specification may also include macro-financial data as explanatory 
variables. When no macroeconomic variables are included, an additional satellite model may 
be used to link the macro-financial variables to borrower-specific data.  
Using a database of yearly accounting data for all limited liability companies in 
Norway, Eklund, Larsen and Berhardsen (2001, Norges Bank) relate the probability of default 
to borrower characteristics such as firm age, size, industry and to accounting variables 
measuring corporate earnings, liquidity, and financial strength. In this model, the projected 
figures for the main macroeconomic variables are used to estimate the future income 
statement and balance sheet of each company and on this basis to calculate individual 
probabilities of default (PDs). These PDs are then aggregated to produce an estimate of the 
banking sector’s total loan loss. 
Individual measures of credit quality can be exploited to estimate a direct relationship 
with macroeconomic variables. Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank) and 
Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB) use Moody’s KMV EDFs to model the average 
credit quality of listed companies. The EDF is a forward-looking, market-based measure of 
credit risk that gauges a firm’s probability of defaulting within a year, based on the volatility 
of its share price.  
In the paper by Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank), the median EDF 
of all Swedish non-financial listed companies proxies for the probability of default. The 
authors estimate a vector error-correction model (VECM) for this aggregate EDF and three 
macroeconomic variables (industrial production index, consumer price index and short-term 
interest rate). Assuming a long-term correlation between variables, a VECM can discern 
shared trends between series as well as short-term fluctuations. The results indicate that the 
macroeconomic variable with the strongest positive impact on EDF is the interest rate; a fall 
in manufacturing output and an increase in inflation also lead to a higher EDF.
21 
                                                  
21   Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges Riksbank) observe that higher inflation implies higher factor prices that lead to 
increased costs and tend to impair credit quality. Moreover, high inflation is usually considered a signal of 
macroeconomic mismanagement and a source of uncertainty. Thus the relation between the default rate and the inflation  
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The model by Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB) also measures credit risk by 
the median EDF of euro area companies, but at sector level (eight economic sectors). The 
model relates the credit quality of European companies to five macroeconomic variables, 
including real equity prices, measured for the whole euro area; the parameters are statistically 
significant and with the expected sign for real equity prices and, in four of the eight sectors, 
for GDP.
22 
In contrast to the use of market-based measures of credit risk, the French Banking 
Commission (FBC) and the BoJ use internal data-sets of individual non-financial company 
ratings, whose evolution over time is summarized by transition matrices.
23 Both models 
estimate the sensitivity of a non-linear transformation of the probability that borrowers will 
migrate to a different rating class with respect to a limited number of macroeconomic 
variables.
24 In the FBC model, the macroeconomic variables are GDP and short-term and 
long-term interest rates. In the BoJ model, a system of five equations (one for each rating 
class) is estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression to take account of possible correlation 
between error terms. Explanatory variables are GDP growth rate and a leverage ratio as 
proxies of profit and liability conditions. GDP is significant in all but the lowest rating class; 
the results for the debt ratio are more mixed.  
In sum, the survey shows a wide array of approaches to credit risk modeling in terms of 
measures of credit quality, level of aggregation, and estimation methodology. Methods that 
use current financial market data to predict bankruptcies (as contrasted with modeling LLPs 
or NPLs) within a given time horizon may be able to detect problems in the loan portfolio 
earlier than those based on loan classification data. Such methods, however, are restricted to 
listed companies and so may not be readily applicable in some countries. A common feature 
is that the macroeconomic variables used as explanatory variables are not numerous. As for 
the level of aggregation, models based on individual data can in principle lead to more 
accurate results; if these data are not available, there can still be benefits associated with 
parsimonious models using more aggregate data, as noted by Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, 
Sveriges Riksbank).  
 
5.  Stress test implementation 
In the third stage of a typical stress testing process the macroeconomic models 
(structural, vector auto-regressive, or purely statistical) are used to project the values of the 
macroeconomic variables under stress conditions and then apply an auxiliary model of credit 
risk to estimate credit quality under stress. 
                                                                                                                                                      
rate should be positive. However, higher inflation also implies higher product prices, which can boost earnings and a 
lower debt burden in real terms, thereby improving creditworthiness.  
22   The fact that the interest rate is not significant may seem to be a counter-intuitive result in view of its importance as a 
driver of corporate credit quality. Castrén, Dèes, and Zaher (2008, ECB) explain by reference to the characteristics of the 
dependent variable: the main drivers of EDFs are the value of asset/equity (market capitalization) and the default point 
(which is a function of liabilities), so it is not surprising that the econometric analysis confirm the role of equity prices 
and not of interest rates. 
23   See Commission Bancaire (2007) and Bank of Japan (2007). 
24  In the BoJ model, the banks’ borrower classification data available at the central bank were supplemented with credit 
scores provided by a Japanese rating agency.  
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As noted, all the authorities reviewed used a macro-econometric structural model for the 
FSAP exercises. In the Italian FSAP, one macroeconomic scenario involved a shock to oil and 
share prices. The effects on domestic macroeconomic variables were simulated using the BoI 
quarterly macro-econometric model to generate deviations from a baseline projection over 
several time horizons. The macroeconomic projections for output gap and short-term interest 
rate were used in the credit risk model to calculate an after-shock PD; the result was an 
estimated increase of 83 percent.  
In such an approach, however, the structural macroeconomic model generates point 
estimates associated with a single future path, the conditional mean path under the stress 
scenario, with no probabilistic interpretation.  
The VAR/VECM framework can generate stress scenarios that do allow for 
probabilistic interpretations. Shock sizes are specified in terms of the unconditional standard 
deviation of the innovation in an autoregressive series, and under a normality assumption they 
can be given a probabilistic interpretation. Thus scenarios do not follow from the economic 
reasoning behind a structural macro-model but are based only on a probabilistic method. Tail 
outcomes of such simulations present extreme scenarios. 
Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2006) were the first to present a VAR 
model to generate a probabilistic scenario for credit risk analysis. Impulse response functions 
are used to examine how an isolated shock to one macroeconomic variable affects all the 
others. Impulse response functions assume that the other variables are displaced according to 
their historical covariances with the variable being shocked, so that the correlations across 
shocks are accounted for in an appropriate manner. The authors examine the impact on a 
hypothetical corporate loan portfolio and its exposure to a range of macroeconomic shocks. 
For example, they find that a 2.33-standard-deviation drop in real US equity prices causes an 
expected loss of 80 bp over four quarters. This approach is particularly valuable in addressing 
specific risk-management questions and, in particular, producing a rank order of the possible 
shock scenarios. 
Examples of scenarios generated by this probabilistic method are given in the stress 
exercises conducted at the BoJ and in Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS) and Castren, 
Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB). In the BoJ model, the stress test assesses the impact of a 
negative GDP shock of a size that has a one percent probability. Jiménez and Mencía (2007, 
BoS) apply a 3-standard-deviation shock to the GDP and interest rate variables; similarly, 
Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB) use a 5-standard-deviation shock for one 
macroeconomic variable of the GVAR model. 
The OeNB’s SRM multivariate t-copula approach is used to draw risk factor changes 
randomly according to their estimated multivariate distribution. One or more of the simulated 
risk factor changes are set to a fixed value according to the given shock; changes for all other 
(non-stressed) risk factors are drawn from the conditional distribution given the stress 
scenario. For example, the SRM model documentation evaluates the impact of a drop in GDP 
or of a rise in interest rates; the t-copula approach ensures consistency with the overall 
dependency structure between risk factors.
25 
                                                  
25   The model can also simulate the effect of one single-factor shock (unconditional simulation). See Boss, Breuer, Elsinger, 
Jandacka, Krenn, Lehar, Puhr, and Summer (2006, OeNB).  
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Van den End, Hoeberichts, and Tabbae (2006, DNB) propose an alternative method that 
accounts for simultaneous changes in the macroeconomic variables and their interactions as 
typically present in the macro scenarios derived from structural macro-models. To simulate 
the hypothetical stress scenario, the projected values of the macroeconomic factors are 
included to re-estimate a VAR model including GDP and interest rate. Re-estimating a VAR 
that includes stressed values for the macroeconomic factors can take into account changes in 
the correlations, and overcome the objection that stress-testing models posit constant 
statistical relationships, which might not be the case in stress situations. 
A similar procedure is applied in the paper by Åsberg and Shahnazarian (2008, Sveriges 
Riksbank): they use the impulse responses of the Riksbank’s macro-econometric model to a 
given shock (e.g. a supply shock) to estimate stressed values for the three macroeconomic 
variables of a VEC-model that also include EDFs (see Section 4.2). The VEC-model is then 
used to forecast the stressed EDFs conditional on the stressed values of the macroeconomic 
variables. 
 
6.  Impact measures 
The final step in the stress testing process is evaluating the impact on the banks’ loan 
portfolio and judging whether banks can withstand the shock assumed. This means comparing 
the loss with an appropriate benchmark. 
Depending on the credit risk model used, the results of the simulation can be expressed 
in terms of either provisions or projected default rates. In the latter case, given a (usually ad-
hoc) figure for the recovery rate, one can estimate banks’ expected losses, which determines 
the volume of loss provisions. As observed in Čihák (2007), in a normal situation (“baseline 
scenario”), banks would typically be profitable. When carrying out stress tests, it is important 
to evaluate impacts against such a baseline, as banks would exhaust profits before undergoing 
reductions in their balance-sheet or regulatory capital position. Expressing shocks only in 
terms of capital may result in overestimating the actual impacts if banks remain profitable in 
the baseline scenario. However, to accomodate the view that it is prudent to disregard profits 
one can measure losses directly against capital or capitalization (capital or equity to assets, or 
capital to risk-weighted assets). The effects on capital adequacy ratios are obviously 
particularly important for agencies with supervisory responsibilities.  
An important extension focuses specifically on the impact measure. Instead of 
producing accounting measures of distress as point estimates under the assumed stress 
scenarios, more recent work has sought to derive a profit and loss distribution for the loan 
portfolio of the banking system as a whole, extending to system-wide scale the risk 
management framework adopted at a micro-level by many financial institutions in their risk 
management systems. The loss distribution shows the probability of loan losses of various 
sizes – from no losses occurring to the loss of the entire loan portfolio. The expected loss – 
the mean of the distribution – is normally covered by earnings; banks need to hold a capital 
buffer to cover losses above those expected (unexpected loss or value-at-risk).
26 The 
                                                  
26   The shape of the loss distribution of a given portfolio is to a large extent determined by the presence of name 
concentration and/or correlations between the different exposures/sectors. In the setting described in this paper, 
correlation is determined by the common dependence on the various macroeconomic factors (multi-factor portfolio credit  
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estimation of a loss distribution for the banking system’s loan portfolio makes it possible to 
calculate the size of the aggregate capital buffer given a tolerance level (the economic 
capital). 
In the context of a loan loss distribution, the stress exercise can be couched in terms of 
deterministic shifts in the parameters, such as the PD and the loss-given-default (LGD). See, 
for instance, the sensitivity analyses reported in Sveriges Riksbank (2006). Alternatively, 
macro stress scenarios like those discussed in Section 3 can be used to simulate adverse 
macroeconomic conditions that – using the satellite models described in Section 4 – generate 
a stressed aggregate PD or a set of stressed sectoral PDs. Via this link, the stress test has a 
clear economic interpretation. 
The idea of measuring the impact of credit shocks in terms of an overall system-wide 
credit loss distribution – as opposed to banks’ expected losses – was first discussed in Sorge 
and Virolainen (2005) and applied in the OeNB’s SRM stress test model.
27 Research projects 
along these lines are planned or under way at many authorities with a view to improving the 
existing framework. 
In a first approach, used in Alessandri, Gai, Kapadia, Mora, and Puhr (2007, BoE), 
Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS), and Van den End, Hoeberichts, and Tabbae (2006, DNB), 
the portfolio loss distribution is estimated using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, taking 
random draws of the innovations in the macroeconomic factors (GDP, interest rates, etc.).
28 
The estimation can be performed at aggregate level for the banking system or for individual 
banks. 
In a second approach, used by Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB), in the 
OeNB’s SRM, and by the Sveriges Riksbank (2006), the simulation of random innovations in 
the macroeconomic factors is supplemented with a readily-available portfolio model, such as 
Credit Risk Plus. The use of a full-blown portfolio model can combine predictions on default 
frequencies with more granular information on the credit quality of individual borrowers. 
The OeNB’s SRM calculates a loss distribution using a modified version of Credit Risk 
Plus. Sectoral default frequencies from the model are combined with individual borrowers’ 
default probabilities from the central credit register by adapting the latter according to the 
difference with the model-predicted default frequencies. If, for example, the model-predicted 
default frequency doubles due to changes in macroeconomic variables, this will result in a 
doubling of default probabilities of individual borrowers, which is then used to calculate the 
overall credit loss distribution using Credit Risk Plus. 
A similar but simpler procedure is used by Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow (2008, ECB) 
and by the Riksbank. Instead of using individual default probabilities, both studies make 
assumptions about the creditworthiness of borrowers and classify loan portfolios into three 
                                                                                                                                                      
risk model). The shape is typically skewed and has a relatively fat right tail, indicating that, although losses less than or 
around the expected value are most frequent, more extreme outcomes may also occur. 
27   A similar analysis is conducted also in Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2006). 
28  In the paper by Jiménez and Mencía (2007, BoS), the simulation also includes random draws of the innovations in the 
latent factors; the BoE’s model combines various sources of risk (see foot-note 12) and the corresponding output is a 
distribution of total banks’ assets rather than pure credit losses.  
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quality classes; aggregate Moody’s KMV EDFs of the lower and higher credit quality 
portions of the portfolio are adjusted accordingly. 
Moving from a baseline to a stress scenario is likely to produce a shift in the conditional 
loss distribution and in the corresponding value-at-risk measure; accordingly, the stressed 
value-at-risk will measure the economic capital to be held in order to cover unexpected credit 
losses; in order to assess whether the banking system can withstand the assumed shock it 
should then be compared with a measure of actual capital held for credit risk by the banking 
system.  
As is noted by Bonti, Kalkbrener, Lotz and Stahl (2006), stress tests performed within a 
portfolio credit risk model enable one to assess the outcomes of a stress scenario consistently 
with the quantitative framework used in a normal, non-stressed situation, because the stress 
scenario is translated into movements of “internal” risk drivers (the macroeconomic risk 
factors). The risk measures of the model (expected loss, value-at-risk) can be studied relative 
to the baseline simulation derived from the unconditional (non-stressed) risk factor 
distribution. Using the same quantitative framework for normal and stressed situations implies 
that the relationships between non-stressed risk factors remain intact and the experience 
gained in the day-to-day use of the model can be used to interpret the results from stress 
testing.
29 
Finally, depending on the availability of micro data, it is important that central banks 
and supervision authorities calculate the impact at the individual bank level and not only for 
an aggregate system-wide portfolio. In fact, seeing the distribution throughout the system is 
essential to assessing the threat of contagion and the possible impact of confidence effects on 
stability. 
 
7.  Discussion and evaluations 
This section discusses the main findings of the survey, highlighting a number of 
methodological issues that may be relevant to supervisors in reviewing stress testing 
requirements under Basel II. From a financial stability perspective, it contributes to the on-
going macroprudential research efforts to integrate macroeconomic oversight and prudential 
supervision by facilitating early detection of key vulnerabilities and the assessment of macro-
financial linkages. 
7.1. Characteristics of the credit risk models 
One application of the macro credit risk models is the calculation of IRB capital 
requirements in stress scenarios: the impact of a macro stress scenario on regulatory capital 
can be evaluated by recalculating the Basel II formula with the stressed PDs from the credit 
risk model. The models surveyed here differ significantly in such areas as the measure of 
credit quality chosen, the level of aggregation, and the estimation methodology. 
a)  Borrower credit quality is modeled either on the basis of loan performance data, requiring 
time series data on different proxies for default rates (such as NPLs or LLPs), or on the 
                                                  
29   Consistency is one of the desirable properties of stress testing mentioned also in a Basel Committee study on credit risk 
concentration (BCBS, 2006).  
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basis of market-based indicators (such as Moody’s KMV EDFs). The use of different 
variables raises several issues that must be considered in interpreting the results. For 
example, loan performance is a “retrospective” indicator of asset quality: loan loss 
provisioning rules or policies may affect the financial statement data that are used. 
Market-based indicators, on the other hand, are fully reliable only for listed firms. 
Moreover, the magnitude and statistical significance of the relevant macroeconomic 
variables’ estimated coefficients may differ with the indicator of credit quality. 
b)  The studies reviewed here use different levels of aggregation for the dependent variable. 
Whenever possible, disaggregated data are essential to capture the differing response of 
sectors/banks/portfolios to stress scenarios. One major shortcoming of econometric 
models based on aggregate data is that the conditional means may conceal significant 
variation at portfolio or bank level. More specifically, this procedure fails to detect 
uncertainty about (variations in) the actual defaults at the level of the single sector, bank, 
or individual obligor. Thus, the loss distribution obtained (see below) is more 
concentrated than the underlying overall loss distribution and so misses information about 
the extreme tails. 
c)  The survey shows the importance of the model development stage, i.e. the statistical 
model-building technique. Generally the first step in the selection of variables is to cull an 
initial set of macroeconomic and financial variables that theory and empirical evidence 
suggest affect credit risk. The second step selects the “preferred” specification of the 
model such that it is consistent with economic theory and satisfies a set of statistical 
selection criteria. In sum, a parsimonious selection of uncorrelated or weakly correlated, 
statistically significant, and intuitively understandable variables makes the model more 
attractive for stress testing. In particular, economic plausibility is a key requirement in all 
the models: the economic meaning of the macroeconomic factors used must be clear, with 
no counter-intuitive relationships with the dependent variable. 
d)  The most important aspect in assessing the model specification process is overall 
performance, in-sample and out-of-sample. A common feature of macro-econometric-
based models of credit risk is that macroeconomic variables alone tend to explain a fairly 
small part of the variation of the dependent variable, especially when only one or two 
macroeconomic variables are considered (omitted variables). The goodness-of-fit is 
considerably improved by the inclusion of latent variables (unobserved common factors), 
possibly accounting for micro-contagion effects. Failing to include such variables can 
result in significant underestimation of tail risk. 
e)  Other important aspects to emerge from our examination of the model specification 
process include: (i) the model's ability to handle low-quality data (missing values, outliers, 
structural breaks); (ii) the time period used for calibration, which should span at least one 
full business cycle to ensure capturing the cyclical effects on default probabilities; (iii) an 
evaluation of parameter stability and of model robustness. 
7.2. The formulation of stress scenarios and stress test methods  
The models used to simulate macroeconomic scenarios range from more structural, 
which are better suited for policy analysis, to pure statistical methods that model the 
multivariate distribution of macro-financial variables using nonlinear dependence structures  
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(e.g., based on multivariate copulas). An intermediate option consists of reduced-form models 
such as VAR or VECM, which retain some of the desirable policy-analysis features of a 
structural model combined with some of the flexibility of a more statistical approach. 
However, macro models are generally local approximations of equilibrium relationships. 
They are not necessarily suitable for assessing the effect of large shocks, which are very likely 
to produce non-linearities and regime shifts. This results in uncertainty over the size and 
sometimes the sign of the response. Whichever model is chosen, it is essential that the 
stressed macroeconomic variables be internally consistent. 
So far financial institutions have had trouble selecting “big picture” macroeconomic 
scenarios and have preferred to calibrate shocks directly in terms of micro-variables. For 
individual firms, therefore, models such as VAR or VECM based on just a few variables can 
be feasible for designing internally consistent macroeconomic scenarios in a simple and 
transparent way and conducting macro stress tests without requiring particularly substantial 
resources. 
7.3. Impact measures and the estimation of a loss distribution 
While early stress testing exercises concentrated mostly on expected losses, most of the 
recent methodologies estimate the entire portfolio loss distribution. 
The loss distribution provides a measure of the credit VaR (economic capital or capital 
at risk) as well as other measures of “tail risk” under stress. In particular, the shape of the 
right-hand tail of the portfolio loss distribution is to a large extent dependent on key risk 
factors such as portfolio concentration and on correlations between risk components (PD, 
LGD, and exposure-at-default, EAD), which are not captured by other risk metrics such as 
expected losses. Stressed loss distributions can be used to examine stress scenarios in a 
consistent setting, and in particular to evaluate the future capital needs of banks to comply 
with their economic capital constraints under stress conditions, as required in the more 
general Pillar II stress test.  
Our survey found basically two approaches to estimating credit loss distributions in the 
context of a macroeconomic multi-factor credit risk model. A first approach applies only 
Monte Carlo simulations of innovations in macroeconomic factors to obtain stressed 
aggregate or sectoral PDs. This implies: (i) treating every loan in the estimation bucket 
(aggregate or sector) as equally risky regardless of the credit quality of borrowers; (ii) 
assuming that realized losses are always equal to expected losses or else that banks hold an 
infinitely granular portfolio. This would result in an underestimation of risk.
30 In a second 
approach the simulation of random innovations of the macroeconomic factors is supplemented 
with a full-blown portfolio credit risk model, which generates loss distributions with greater 
variance and fatter tails. 
In estimating the baseline and stressed loss distributions, much attention has been given 
to modeling default rates; there has not been much progress in modeling LGDs and EADs, 
and in most cases, ad-hoc values for LGDs are assumed (e.g., downturn LGDs and EADs are 
typically kept constant). However, in stressed scenarios PDs often increase as the financial 
                                                  
30   For the first remark, see Boss, Breuer, Elsinger, Jandacka, Krenn, Lehar, Puhr, and Summer (2006, OeNB), for the 
second see Alessandri, Gai, Kapadia, Mora, and Puhr (2007, BoE).  
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strength of households and firms deteriorates, LGDs increase as recovery rates fall with asset 
prices, and EADs increase as credit lines are drawn on in worsening financial conditions. 
Ignoring these correlations among PDs, LGDs and EADs can result in a considerable 
underestimation of tail losses. It is accordingly important to model the joint behavior of these 
three variables in stress scenarios, as their correlations tend to increase in stress conditions.  
 
8.  Concluding remarks 
This paper reviews the quantitative methods developed at selected central banks and 
supervision authorities for stress testing credit risk. The focus is on macro stress testing. i.e. 
the linkage of the macroeconomic drivers of stress with bank-specific measures of credit risk, 
with a view to helping supervisors in reviewing stress tests for compliance with Basel II and 
contributing to the on-going research efforts to integrate macroeconomic oversight and 
prudential supervision. 
As a result of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Programs, central banks have 
acquired specific modeling expertise in this sector. The review shows the modeling and 
organizational complexity of macro-stress testing, which involves a number of stages. The 
first step is to design a coherent macroeconomic stress scenario that is consistent with the 
application of a macro-econometric model. The second step, since these models generally do 
not include the financial sector, is to apply “satellite”  models to measure credit risk, mapping 
the macroeconomic variables onto some measures of banks’ asset quality. The third step is the 
assessment of losses under stress scenarios, evaluating them in connection with variables that 
gauge the banking system’s ability to withstand shocks. 
The paper outlines and compares features of the approaches adopted at the various 
authorities and traces the latest developments. In particular: (i) in devising scenarios central 
bank researchers increasingly adopt models that are more flexible and easier to use, such as 
VARs and other strictly statistical rather than structural models; (ii) the satellite models for 
credit risk display a great variety of statistical methods, dependent variables, and levels of  
aggregation, while the explanatory variables are more uniform and not numerous (sometimes 
the goodness-of-fit may not be a prime consideration); the most recent models, when data are 
available, incline towards a sectoral aggregation, which permits distinguishing between 
cyclical and acyclical sectors; (iii) unlike the early macro-stress testing, which assessed the 
impact of stress scenarios on expected losses, current research projects tend to envisage an 
assessment of the entire portfolio loss distribution and unexpected losses under stress 
conditions. 
Finally, the paper analyzes and discusses a series of methodological aspects with a view 
to improving macro-stress testing models. A number of research programs are working to 
overcome some of these limitations. In particular, the current objectives are to extend time 
horizons and build in banks’ actions to adjust balance sheets in response to the stress 
scenarios (as, for example, by changing lending and borrowing policy). In this way it would 
be possible to take account of the potential transmission, and amplification, of a shock within 
the financial system to the real economy.  
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dependent variable independent variables
Bank of England
logit transformation of 
aggregate default 
rates
 - GDP growth                         
- short-term IR                         
- equity return
linear OLS regressions on 
quarterly data                        
(various samples)
Macroeconomic scenarios are generated 
by a two-country GVAR (UK, US) model, 
which includes six country variables and a 
foreign variable   (see ECB box)
Conditional/unconditional GVAR 






1990(1)-2005(2);                    
quarterly data;                        
VAR(1) estimation
The BOI’s quarterly macroeconometric 
model. For shocks affecting the Euro-area 
and/or the world economy, satellite models 
used for the Eurosystem projections or IMF 
models were also applied
The outputs of the macro model 
(stressed output gap and interest rate) 
are the input of the credit risk VAR model









logit transformation of 
sectoral default rates 
(8 corporate sectors)
GDP growth, equity index, 
competitiveness index, 
interest rate, two contagion 
latent factors depending on 
the sector
1990(1)-2006(3);                    
quarterly data;                               
SUR estimation
 the BOI's quarterly macroeconometric 
model (under way)                                        
 the output of the macro model in term of 
stressed macroeconomic variables are 
the input of the sectoral credit risk model 
(under way)                                            






of the probability of a 
rating transition
 - GDP growth                         
- ratio of interest-bearing 
liability to cash flow
data on bank borrowers                
SUR regression for a system of 5 
equations (one for each rating 
category)                                
1985-2005
a VAR model comprised of five variables:    
GDP                                                              
CPI                                                                
bank loan outstanding                                   
effective exchange rate                                 
call rate
VAR forecasts to: i) a negative GDP 
shock, of which probability is one 
percent; b) a negative GDP shock 
equivalent to the financial crisis since 
1997
maximum loss to capital derived 








of the default rate    
 - quarterly change in real 
GDP growth                            
-  variation of three-month 
real interest rate                      
- term spread                          
- six sectoral variables            
- two latent factors
10 sectoral equations for 
corporates;                                    
2 equations for households;          
1984Q4-2006Q4                           
VAR(1) estimation for the macroeconomic 
variables and for the latent factors
an artificial shock (3 standard deviations) 
to the GDP and interest rate variables is 
introduced in the vector of innovations 
Stressed credit loss distribution
Jimenez-
Mencia (2007)
logit transformation of 
the default rate
 - real GDP growth                  
- term spread
First type of stress: the deviations of the 
macro variable from the baseline 
scenarios - obtained as output of the 
macroeconomic model - are input in the 
credit risk model                          
First type of stress: stressed 
PDs, expected losses
logit transformation of 
the LLP ratio
 - real GDP growth                  
-  long-term IR                         
- logit transformation of the 
default rate
Second type of stress:  the stressed 
(future) values of the macro-variables as 
projected by the macroeconomic model 
are used to estimate a AR(2) o a VAR(2) 
model for the macroeconomic variables 
of the credit risk equations
Second type of stress: a stressed 
credit loss distribution is 
simulated by taking random 
draws of the innovations in the 
macro variables used in the 
"stressed" VAR(2) model
logit transformation of 
the LLP ratio
 - lagged dependent variable
- credit growth
- real GDP growth
- variation short-term IR
credit growth
 - lagged credit growth            
- real GDP growth                   
- variation short-term IR
TABLE 1: MACRO STRESS TESTING OF CREDIT RISK - METHODOLOGY OF SELECTED AUTHORITIES
Deutsche Bundesbank
a system of 2 simultaneous 
equations;                                     
panel data from 1993; dynamic 
panel estimation
The macroeconometric model developed 
at the Bundesbank used to generate 
projections of the macroeconomic 
variables
Given the initial shock to the exogenous 
variables, the stressed values of the 
macroeconomic variables are used to 
project an after-shock value of the 




a system of 2 simultaneous 
equations;                                
annual data 1990-2004; panel 
estimation
i) the domestic macroeconomic model 
developed at the DNB plus NIGEM world 
model. They are used to generate 
projections of the macroeconomic 
variables given the initial shock to the 
exogenous variables;                                    
ii) a VAR(2) model for the macroeconomic 













data                        
and estimation
macroeconometric model stress methodology reference impact measure
- corporate default rate                                                
- ouput gap                                                                   
- inflation rate                                                               
- 3m IR                                                                         




dependent variable independent variables
ECB
EDF of euro area 
corporates
 - euro area real GDP                 
- CPI inflation                             
- real equity prices                      
- real euro/US$ exchange rate   
- short tem IR
regression model of the median 
EDF (1 aggregate/8 sector 
specific);                                  
quarterly data,                            
1992-2005
Macroeconomic scenarios are 
generated by a global VAR (GVAR) 
model which includes 7 variables 
(six country/region variables and a 
vector of foreign variables specific to 
each country/region) and 33 
countries, where 8 of the 11 
countries that originally formed the 
euro area are grouped together and 
the remaining 25 countries are 
modelled individually by a VECM
The impulse responses from the GVAR 
model to 5 standard deviation shocks to 
one of the macrovariable of the GVAR 
model
Stressed credit loss distribution
Castrén-Dées-






logit transformation of 
the probability of a 
rating transition
 - GDP                                        
- short-term IR                            
- long-term IR
logit/probit estimation based on 
observed transition matrices and 
macroeconomic variables
The Mascotte macroeconometric 
model developed by the Banque de 
France for macroeconomic forecasts
The outputs of the macro model 
(stressed GDP, s.t. and l.t. interest rates) 
are the input of the credit risk model
Stressed solvency ratio                  
as a result of stressed risk-
weighted assets (via credit risk 
model) and a stressed capital (via 





 - lagged risk-weighted debt 
(RWD)                                        




age, size, accounting variables 
measuring corporate earnings, 
liquidity and financial strenghts
Sveriges Riksbank
Monthly data 1997-2006               
VECM estimation                          
The DSGE model used for policy 
simulation generates forecasts and 
stress scenarios for the three macro 
variables included in the VEC-model. 
The VEC-model is used to forecast a 
stressed EDF by conditioning the model 
on ad-hoc stressful scenario based on 
the DSGE model.
- Conditioned or stressed EDFs    
-  The conditioned or stressed 
EDFs are also used as inputs for 









logit transformation of 
the LLP ratio
 - GDP growth                            
- unemployment rate                  
- level of 3m IR                           
- corporate bond spread             
- bank control variables
1987-2004;                                    
static and dynamic panel 
estimation
Macroeconomic variables are replaced 
by the values assumed in the stress 
scenarios. Given an initial shock to one 
of those variables, the change in the 





- EDF of Swedish listed companies                                
- domestic industrial product index                                  
- domestic consumer price index                                     
- nominal domestic 3m IR                                                
Norges Bank
The scenarios were developed using 
Norges Bank's macroeconomic 
model. Projections from this model 
were used as a baseline scenario
The change in the macrovariables from 
the macroeconometric model are 
translated into changes in accounting 
variables and a stressed PD is obtained
A logit model that predicts 
individual bankruptcy 
probabilities estimated using the 
entire population of enterprises 
(about 400.000) in Norges 
Bank’s accounts database for 
the period 1990-1996. 
Expected losses
Agency reference impact measure
credit risk model
data                        
and estimation
macroeconometric model stress methodology
Eklund-Larsen-
Berhardsen (2001)  
Hagen-Lund-
Nordal-Steffensen 
(2005)            
TABLE 1 (continued): MACRO STRESS TESTING OF CREDIT RISK - METHODOLOGY OF SELECTED AUTHORITIES
Österreichische 
Nationalbank (OeNB)
ML estimation of the first 
difference of the logit 
transformation of observed 
industry default rates;                    
independent estimation for 7 
sectors (total 11 sectors);              
quarterly data:                               
1969-2007
i) within SRM: Modeling of the joint 
distribution of macroeconomic and 
market risk factors through a t-
grouped copula approach with 4 
groups (macroeconomic variables, 
interest rates, fx-rates, equity price 
indices)                                                
ii) For FSAP 2007: Domestic model 
developed at the OeNB plus NiGEM 
world model to project 
macroeconomic variables given an 






current version is 
planned to be 
published in 2008
depending on the industry:         
- real GDP                                  
- Industrial Production                
- Unemployment Rate                
- Equipment Investments           
- Oil (Brent) in Euro                    
- Real Short-term IR                   
- Real 5y IR                                
all variables (except 
unemployment rate) were 
taken as logarithmic changes 
of the moving average over 
four quarters  
first difference of the 
logit transformation of 
industry default rates
i) Within SRM: risk factors 
(macroeconomic variables and market 
risk factors) are increased by percentage 
or percentage points or set to the 
stressed value                                         
ii) For Fsap: Projected outputs of the 
macroeconometric model are used as 
input for the credit risk model
 - Stressed Capital Adequacy  
Ratio (CAR) and expected losses; 
- with the Systemic Risk Monitor 
(SRM) wherein the credit risk 
model is integrated a loss 
distribution is estimated using a 
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